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Has the Deregulation of
Deposit Interest Rates
Raised Mortgage Rates?
R. Alton Gilbert and A. Steven Holland
EGISLATION enacted in 1980 calls forthe gradual
phase-out ofinterest rate ceilings on deposits atbanks
and thrift institutions by 1986.1 This legislation was
intended to increase the efficiency offinancial markets,
which a deregulated financial environment provides,
and permit small savers toearn more competitive rates
on their savings. Many of these interest rate ceilings
already have been removed.
Some economists have suggested that the payment
ofhigherinterest rates to depositors has contributed to
the high rates of interest in this country over the last
fewyears. According to Arenson (1983) in theNew York
limes, “Economists estimate that the higher cost of
bank funds probably has raised the genet-al level of
interest rates by about 1½ percentage points.” Bacon
(1983), in the Wall Street Journal, quotes Lat~’ence
Chimerine of Chase Econometrics as estimating the
same effect on long-term real rates of interest. The
basic argument is that the phase-out of Regulation Q
has raised the interest expense of depository institu-
tions; in response, these institutions have raised the
interest rates they chat-ge borrowers.
This article assesses the effects of the removal of
deposit rate (Regulation Q) ceilings on the interest
rates chaiged on mortgage loans. While the analysis
developed here applies to all interest rates, we empha-
size mortgage interest rates because large proportions
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of the deposit liabilities of mnajor mortgage lenders,
such as savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and
mutual savings banks, have been subject to Regulation
Q ceiling rates; indeed, one reason for the removal of
these ceilings was to increase the ability of these thrift
institutions to attract deposits to use for mortgage
lending.z Furthermore, some analysts have suggested
that such deregulation has caused mortgage rates to
increase more than other long-term interest rates.3
STEPS IN PHASING OUT
DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS
Table 1 describes the steps that already have been
taken in eliminating deposit interest rate ceilings.
Many of these steps created new types of accounts,
with ceiling rates higher than those on passbook sav-
ings accounts orwith no ceilings at all.The first signifi-
cant steps in the i-elaxation of Regulation Q occurred
even before the passage of the Depository Institutions
2Thrifts currently hold around 40 percent ot the one- to four-family
residential mortgage debt in the United States. They originate a
much greater percentage, however, selling a large proportionof their
mortgages to investors in the form ot mortgage passthrough certifi-
cates. See McNulty (1983) for a discussion ot mortgage origination
and investments of thrift institutions.
3For instance, Edward Friedman (1983), pp. A.40—A.41, of Chase
Econometrics maintains that:
The other ma)or effect of the new deposit structure atthrifts and banks is
the permanent rise in borrowing costs for deposit institution borrowers
relativeto open-market rates . ...The implication is that it, for example,
bond rates were to tallto much lowerlevels, home mortgagerateswould
not necessarily follow point for point.
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Deregulation and Monetary Control Actof1980 (MCA),
with the establishment of money market certificates
(June 1978), automatic transfer service accounts
(November 1978) and small saver certificates (June
1979). The introduction ofNOW accounts nationwide
(January 1981) was the first major change in deposit
interest rate ceilingsput into effectunder provisions of
the MCA.4
The Depositosy Institutions Deregulation Commit-
tee has the responsibility for complete removal of de-
posit rate ceilings by 1986. The committee meets
periodically during the transition period, and most of
the changes described in table I represent the out-
comes ofthese meetings. Currently, the only ceilingsin




In analyzing how mortgage rates are determined
and how they might be affected by the deregulation of
deposit interest rates, we assume that lenders, deposi-
tors and borrowers are all wealth-maximizers. In par-
ticular-, we assume that lenders attempt to maximize
their profits, depositors attempt to get the highest in-
terest return they can for a given degree of nsk, and
borrowers search fot- the lowest interest rates, given
other contractual characteristics of the loan.
We also make two alternative assumptions about
competitive forces in the market for residential mort-
gages. Under the first assumption, interest rates on
residential mortgages are determined in acompetitive
national mar-ket by theinteraction ofthe total demand
for- and supply of long-term credit. Under the second
assumption, each depository institution has some
market power-that permits it tochoose the interest i-ate
at which it lends.
In the first case, the phasing out of Regulation Q
would increase the supply of long-term credit, due to
an increase in savings by those whose returns from
saving previously were limited by Regulation Q ceiling
rates. The increase in the supply of credit would cause
long-term interest rates to fall. This is illustrated in
figure 1 as a rightward movement in the supply curve
fiom S~to ~2 and areduction inthe rate ofinterest from
4
NOW accounts were availablefor many years in New England before
their introduction nationwide.
5The prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits is not
affected by the MCA.
Fig,,,e I
Effect of Eliminating the Regulation 0 teiliag Rate on
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i1 to L. Of course, the decline in rates may be small; it
depends on the extent to which deposit rate ceilings
limited the incentives for- saving. There would be no
change in the relationship between mortgage and
other long-term interest rates, since differences in risk
and liquidity that determine the spreads in interest
iates between various types of long-term secur ties
would not beaffected by the phase-out ofRegulation Q.
The conclusion is not dramatically different if resi-
dential mortgages are made by specialized lending
institutions that havesome market power. Ifafirm with
mat-ket power- raises its mor-tgage i-ate, it will make
fewer loans than if it offered mortgage credit at lower
interest ratesY This is illustrated by the downward-
sloping demand curve(L)~~) in figure 2. We also assume
that the firm must raise the interest i-ate it pays on
small-denomination deposits if it wishes to attract
more ofthese deposits~.~~his is illustrated by the up-
wai-d-sloping supply curve ~ In conti-ast, the firm
can attract all the large-denomination deposits it
wants by selling certificates of deposit at the rate of
eLenders might have such market power if most borrowers were
limited to borrowing from institutions with offices in their local area
and if the government restricted the number ofinstitutions that may
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o Ceiling Rate on
Pale Set by a Lender with Market Power
03 03 04
/ Demand to, mortgages
MR / Moeginot revenue
Ss~/ Supply of smolf,denominotion deposits
MC
50
’ Marginal cost of smoll,ctenomin otioe deposits
interest determined in acompetitive national market.
With no Regulation Qceilings in effect, we assume this
interest r-ate is ~
‘thelender maximizes profits bylending the amount
of mortgages at which the marginal cost (the increase
in total cost due to the last dollar increase in mortgage
lending) equals the marginal revenue (the increase in
total revenue from the last dollar increase in mortgage
lending). Marginal cost and marginal revenue are illus-
trated by MC (thehea~yblack line) and MB, respective-
ly, in figure 2.
The relevant matginal cost curve has two portions:
(1) For deposit levels below Q, it is the marginal cost of
attracting small-denomination deposits )MC5~3),since
MC50 is less than the interest rate on large-denomina-
tion deposits, ir~,i.(2) For deposit levels above Q~, it is
equal to i’<01. If the lender- wants to attract more de-
posits than ft formortgage lending, it will attract 0,2as
small-denomination deposits and any additional
funds as large-denomination deposits. In figure 2, if
thei-e aie no ceilings on deposit rates, the profit-
maximizing quantity of mortgage loans is ft with a
mortgage rate of ~M1 and arate on small-denomination
deposits of i~131.
Suppose regulators impose amaximum interest rate
that may be paid on small-denomination deposits of
i~0~.7 The lender willbe able to attract only ft of small-
denomination deposits and will have to atttact any
additional hinds in the market for large-denomination
deposits. Each lender increases its demand for large-
denomination deposits, causing the interest i-ate on
these deposits to rse (to lLuz, for instance). By con-
structing anew marginal cost curve in the same man-
ner as before (not shown),we find thatthe new equilib-
rium mortgage rate rises to ~M2, and the amount of
mortgage lending falls to ft. Thus, thetheory indicates
that a binding ceiling on the interest rates paid on
small-denomination deposits results in a higher in-
terest rate on mortgage loans, less mortgage lending,
and a higher interest rate on large-denomination
deposits.5 Therefore, the elimination of Regulation Q
MC ceilings should result in lower mortgage interest rates.
Given this conclusion, what are we to make of the
argument that the phase-out of Regulation Q ceiling
rates has caused mortgageinterest rates torise? It is an
assertion that is inconsistent with standard economic
analysis, which is based on the wealth-maximizing
behavior of business firms and individuals.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO
MORTGAGE HATES?
We now compare the recent behavior of mortgage
interest rates with movements in other- maiket rates
and the average cost of hinds for S&Ls.The objective is
to determine whether-the evidence supports the argu-
ment that deregulation ofdeposit interest rate ceilings
has caused mortgage interest rates to rise relative to
other market interest rates of comparable duration.
erhe mortgage interest rate series used is published by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development:
the aver-ageinterest rate at which residential mortgage
lenders make commitments to lend for long-term,
fixed-rate conventional loans. The insert on pages 10
and 11 describes several series on residential mortgage
interest rates and discusses the basis for choosing this
measure.
in the theoreticalanalysis illustrated in figure 2, Regulation Q ceiling
rates are assumed to apply only to small-denomination deposits.
This assumption corresponds to the actual structure of ceiling in-
terest rates under Regulation 0, which have exempteddeposits in
denominations of $100,000 or more for many years.
tmThe general conclusions would be the same if all deposits were
subiectto a Regula:ion 0 ceiling rate. Imposing a ceiling interest rate
on all deposits that is below the unregulated market interest rate
would reduce the amount of depositsthe lender could attract. The
profit-maximizing lender with marketpower would raise its mortgage
interest rate to ration the reduced supply of mortgage credit among
its customers.
Fignrn 2
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Chart 1
Semiannual Comparison of Mortgage Interest Rate with
Cost of Funds to S&Ls and 10-Year Treasury Bond Yield
Percent
18
1966 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 1983
Theyield on 10-year U.S. ‘I g-easurybonds is used asa
measure of the inteiest rate on long-term debt obliga-
tions other than residential mortgages.” The 10-year
maturity approximates the average length of tinie that
residential mortgages are outstanding. This is much
shos-ter than the stated matur-ities of conventional
loansbecause of theprepayment of asubstantial num-
ber of mortgage loans before their matut-it’v.
Chart 1 indicates that semiannual averages of the
cost of funds to S&Ls, the mortgage interest rate, and
Lhe yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds tend to move
together over time.’° The relationship between
changes in the mot-tgage and bond rates is somewhat
closer- (correlation coefficient of 0.897) than between
changes in the mortgage rate and the average cost of
funds (correlation coefficient of 0.816).
All three series were substantially higher in the late
1970s and 1980s than they had been earlier. ‘thus, the
phase-out ofRegulation Qceilings allowed S&Ls to bid
for funds by offering rates that kept pace with rises in
mat-ket interest rates. One indicator- ofhow rising mar-
ket interest rates and the phase-out of Regulation Q
affected the average cost offunds for thrift institutions
is the decline in the share of their deposit liabilities
held inthe fos-mofpassbook savings deposits. Between
TMMayerand Nathan (1983) use the 10-yearTreasury bond rate for the
same purpose.
‘°Theaverage cost of funds for S&Ls, obtained from the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board,incorporates notonlythe interest S&Lspay
on deposits, but also the interest they pay on advances from their
Federal Home Loan Banks and otherborrowed funds. The average
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1978 and 1983, savings deposits (subject to fixed in-
terest rate ceilings) fell from over 35 percent of total
deposits to less than 15 percent. Meanwhile, the new
money market certificates and money masket deposit
accounts each grew to represent about 17 percent of
total deposits.
Chart 3 plots the same three interest rate series on a
monthly basis since May 1979.” The relationships
among the three series enable us to see that changes in
the cost of funds to S&Ls cleasly lag changes in the
mortgage t-ate and the Treasury bond rate, usually by
about two months. A simple statistical analysis
confirms the visual pattern in chart 3. The contempo-
raneous correlation between changes in the cost of
funds and the other two series is actually negative,
though not statistically significant. However, the cor-
‘1See Chamberlain,Olin and Mckenzie (1983) for a discussion of the
monthly costoffunds data. This series is actually themedian cost of
funds rather than the average.
relation between the current change in the mortgage
sate and the change in the cost of hinds two months
later is 0.61212
The Rise of Mortgage Rates Relative to
Other Long-Term Interest Rates
Thebehavior ofmortgage ratessince 1980 appears to
lend empirical support to the hypothesis that dereg-
ulation has resulted in higher mortgagerates relative to
other long-term rates. The average spread between the
mortgage rateand the 10-yearTreasury bond rate from
1966 to 1979ranged generally from 1 to 1.75percentage
points; in the 1980s, it has ranged from 2 to 3 percent-
age points.
‘2The contemporaneous correlation between changes in the mort-
gage rate and changes in the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds is
0.794, indicating that interest rates on both kinds of long-term debt
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Chart 3
Monthly Comparison of Mortgage Interest Rate with
Cost of Funds to S&Ls and 10-Year Treasury Bond Yield
Since1980, however, the average spread between the
mortgage rate and the avet-age cost of funds tbr S&Ls
also has increased, by roughly the same order of mag-
nitude as the increase in the aver-age spread between
mortgage sates and thei-ate on lo-ear-Treasus bonds.
The gap between mortgage interest r-ates and the aver-
age cost of funds stayed mostly between 2 and 3.5
percentage points before1980; since then, it hasvaried
between 3.25 and almost 6 percentage points. There-
fore, the widening in the spi-ead between mortgage
r-atesand the Treasury bond i-atedoes notappear tobe
the result of a higher average cost of funds to S&Ls.
Why, then, did mortgage rates rise relative to rates
on Treasury bonds of compasable term to maturity
after 1980? The answer appears to involve differences
between conventional residential mortgages and
Treasury bonds as debt instruments. ‘the two major
diffes-ences are: II) Most mortgages allow the borrower
to payoffhis debt befos-e maturity without penalty; and
(ZiTher-c is risk of default on mortgage loans. Ti-easury
bond holders face neither prepayment risk nor default
risk.
Mortgage Rates and the
Prepayment Option
Investors must be compensated with higher interest
rates on residential mortgages than on Treasury bonds
to compensate for- the r-isk ofprepayment by debtors.’1
Mortgageborrowers must payahigher interest rate for
such a call option.” The value of this option need not
remain constant over time. In particular, its value will
be higher during periods of more volatile long-term
‘
3
Fora more thorough analysis of the role of the prepayment option in
determining the spread between mortgage interestrates and Trea-
sury bond rates, see Hendershott, Shilling and Villani (1982).
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
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interest rates than during periods of stable rates, be-
cause ofthe incseased likelihood that the ps-epayment
option will be exercised. Long-term interest rateswere
extremely variable by historical standards from 1980 to
1982. Thus, we would expect mortgage rates to rise
relative to Treasury bond rates during this period.
The size of the interest rate premium necessary to
compensate investors for the prepayment option on
residential mortgages can be gauged by examining the
spr-ead between the yield on passthrough securities
issued by the Government National MortgageAssocia-
tion IGNMA} and the yield on 10-year Treasury secu-
rities. The risk of prepayment is the major- difference
between investing in GNMA passthr-oughs and Trea-
sury bonds. Investors who purchase these pass-
through securities receive the interest and principal
payments from a pool of FHA-VA government-
guaranteed residential mortgages. Thus, there is no
more riskof default on the interest and principal pay-
ments on GNMA passthroughs than there is for bonds
issued by the U.S. Treasury. Any prepayment of the
mortgages, however, is ‘passed through” to the
holders of the passthrough securities.’4
This feature reduces the probability of acapital gain
on GNMA passthrough securities compared with an
investment in Treasury bonds. If long-term interest
rates decline after an investor buys Treasury bonds,
their market value rises, and the investor receives a
capital gain if he sells them. In contrast, if long-term
interest sates decline after an investor buys GNMA
passthrough securities, the mortgages in the invest-
ment pool are more likelyto be prepaid. Because such
prepayments i-educe the size of the potential capital
gain, apremium in the form of a higher yield on mort-
gage passthr-oughs is required to make investors indif-
ferent between them and Ts-easusy bonds.
Chart 4 indicates that the spread between yields on
GNMA passthrough securities and 10-year- Treasury
bonds rose during 1980 through early 1983. Thus, one
reason for the relative mci-ease in mnos-tgage interest
rates during those years was arise in the rate premium




Another factor that accounts for a small portion of the spread be-
tween rates on GNMA passthrough securities and Treasurybonds
is the effect of stale and local taxes. Interest earned on Treasury
bonds is exempt from state and local taxes, but earnings on mort-
gage passthroughs are not. There is no reason tosuspect that this
factor has increased in importanceduring recent years. There also
could be differences in yields on these two assets if investors do not
view them as being of roughly equal term to maturity, as we are
assuming.
Mortgage Rates and Default Risk
Anothet- reason for the rise in intes’est rates on con-
ventional mortgages since 1980 appears to be ageneral
rise in interest rates on privately issued debt securities
relative to yields on securities issued orguaranteed by
the federal government. Table 2 shows thatthe aver-age
spread between interest rates on privately issued debt
instruments and “t’reasury securities is higher in the
generally recessionary period, February 1980 to
November 1982, than in theexpansionary period, April
1975 to January 1980.15 This is areflection ofthegreater
default risk associated with privately issued securities
during recessionary periods. In each case, the differ-
ences in mean spreads between the time periods are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.’” The
pattern of spreads between mortgage and Treasury
bond rates is very similar to the pattern of spreads
betweenyields on other privately issued securities and
Treasury securities of comparable duration.
‘rable 2 also indicates that the spreads between
yields on privately issued and U.S. Treasury securities
declined to near their- ps-c-I 980 levels a few months
after the economic s’ecoveiy began in December 1982.
Thedecline in the spread between the mortgage com-
mitment rate and the et~reasurybond rate occurred
despite the authorization of money market deposit
accounts — a majos- relaxation of Regi,rlation Q ceiling
rates that occuri-ed in the first month of the current
recovery.
These observations are supported by thebehavior of
delinquency mates for mortgages. The percentage of
conventional mortgages with payments delinquent for
60 days or more rose steadily from 0.61 per-cent in the
second quarter of1979 to 1.37percer~tin the first quar-
ter of1983, then began to decline. Delinquency rates in
the 1980s have been substantially higher than in the
period 1964—79, which undoubtedly accounts for a
substantial pos-tion of the higher- n~ostgagerates rela-
tive to Treasury bond rates observed since 1980.”
“The period from July 1980 to July 1981 is officially classified as an
economic recovery. The financial markets, however, did not re-
spond during that period as they typically do during expansionary
periods. Stock price indexes were little affected, and the spread
between corporate Baa and Aaa bond rates (known to be influenced
by cyclical factors) changed little. The lack of response is un-
doubledly due to the weakness and short duration of the recovery.
leSomecorporate Baa bonds grant a call optionto the issuer. Partof
the increase in Ihe spread between the Baa bond rate and long-term
Treasurysecurities,therefore, is accountedfor by an increase in the
value ofthis prepayment opfion.
‘7The averagequarterly delinquency rate (60 days or more) for con-
ventional mortgage loans between /1964 and V/I 979 was 0.58
percent; between 1/1980 and IV/1983, it was 1.01 percent. This
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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Chart 4
Selected Interest Rate Spreads
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The effects of the major factors that appear to
account forthe s’ise in mortgage rates relative to Trea-
sury bond rates can beseen in table 3 (and alsoin chart
41. For- the period 1980—82, the premium to compensate
for the risk of prepayment (approximated by the
spread between theyield on GNMApassthi-ough secu-
rities and 10-year ‘treasury bondsl was about 73 basis
points higher on average than in 1975—79. The default
risk premium on privately issued securities not
guaranteed by the government (approximated by the
spread between interest rates on new conventional
residential mortgages and the yield on GNMA pass-
through securitiesl was approximately 50 basis points
higher on average dusing this period. Therefose, both
effects appear to share in the responsibility for highes
mortgage interest rates s-dative to Treasury secui-ities
in the early 1980s. Both have declined during the cur-
rent economic expansion.
CONCLUSION
Economic theory suggests that the der-egulation of
deposit intes-est rates does not cause mortgage rates to
rise and may, in fact, result in lower mortgage interest
rates than would otherwise be observed. Nonetheless,
manybelieve that the higher aver-age cost of obtaining
loanable funds that results from deregulated deposit
r-ates have led to higher- mortgage rates.
Since theintsoduction ofnew types of deposits with
flexible inter-est ceilings (or no ceilings at alli, the aver-
age interest r-ate on mortgage loans, the average cost of
funds for- savings and loan associations, and market
interest rates in genes-al have risen substantially. The
notion that higher mortgage s-ates are clue to the re-
moval of deposit interest rate ceilings, however, is not
supposted.
Although mortgage rates have moved higher relative
to government bond rates of similar duration following
the beginning of deregulation, that pattern appears to
be unrelated to the deregulation of deposit rates. In-
stead, it was the result of more variable interest rates,
which caused a higher premium for the option ofpre-
paying a mortgage loan, and the economic downturn
in the early 1980s, which raised the premium for the
risk of default on mortgages. Since interest rates have
become less variable and an economic expansion has
begun, the spreads between mortgage rates and gov-
ernment bond rates have fallen over the last year to
close to their pre-1980 level.
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